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Abstract 
We investigate if price reversals on the Oslo Stock Exchange can be exploited using a twofold 
method. Our method includes stock selection based on variance ratios and simulation of portfolio 
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1. Introduction 
”Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will 
be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits — of a 
spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of 
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.” 
These are the more than 75 year-old words from John Maynard Keynes’ famous 
book from 1936, ”The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”. It states that 
in desire to do well, individuals tend to take action rather than not. In effect, this could 
cause irrational overreacting to news and events. Does this cause anomalous behaviour on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange? This would suggest some degree of mean reversion in stock 
prices. Could it prove exploitable? These two questions are the main focus for this paper. 
This way, we shed light on whether the assumed rationality and non-existing arbitrage 
opportunities assumed in financial theory holds true in practice. It could also help us by 
getting increased understanding of investor behaviour and its consequences. 
Our research is inspired by the works of Andrew W. Lo and A. Craig MacKinlay, 
who formally introduced the variance ratio in 1988. Why their concept applies to us is best 
explained in context with our goals for this paper. Aiming to form a concise paper focusing 
on readability and continuity, models and data are kept as intuitively comprehensible as 
possible. The variance ratio is a relatively simple measure using well known concepts. 
When added to the implementation of an exploiting contrarian trading algorithm, our 
study is one of few taking this practical approach on a smaller exchange like the OSE. 
First we investigate the possibilities of mean reverting behaviour by using the 
variance ratio criterion. We then relate the observed variance ratio and other stock 
characteristics to the success of a contrarian trading strategy. The practical applicability of 
our strategy is evaluated by using a trade simulation program. We find clear signs of a 
positive relationship between the variance ratio and the success of a contrarian strategy. 
Some degree of predictable persistence in the variance ratio is also found. However this is 
not sufficient to consider our strategy profitable, as most considered portfolios report 
negative returns even before transaction costs. Hence overall, we are not able to reject the 
existence of weak form efficiency for the OSE. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is a review of relevant literature. 
Section 3 explains the methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents and 
discusses our results, while the 6th and final section contains our concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Mean reversion 
In finance, a popular approach in predictions of the future is to investigate possible 
convergence towards an underlying level or rate over time. The subject is essential to 
financial market analysts and academics estimating future cash flows and speculating in 
stocks, as well as more formal testing of equity markets2. We apply the following definition 
of mean reversion in equity markets, as defined by Balvers et al. (2000) “Mean reversion 
refers to a tendency of asset prices to return to a trend path”. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
concept. In this paper, we refer to this trend path as the fundamental value of the stock 
price3. As noted by Hillebrand (2003) mean reversion in stock prices must necessarily 
imply the same for stock returns.  
 
Figure 2.1 Mean reversion concept illustrated 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is one of the most covered aspects of financial 
literature. As seen in Malkiel & Fama (1970) this hypothesis supports the existence of a 
pure random walk (RW) in stock prices. This has to be mutually exclusive with mean 
reversion. Therefore, much of the existing literature on the latter subject involves 
challenging the random walk model as the null hypothesis. In practice, this is testing the 
EMH claim of weak form efficiency in stock prices. This degree of efficiency claims that all 
past prices of a stock are already reflected in today’s price. If so, spending time doing 
technical analysis would be pointless. 
                                                     
2 As seen in e.g. Lo and MacKinlay (1988). 
3 Other suitable names could have been intrinsic value or underlying level of the considered stock price. 
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Main contributions 
“Does the stock market overreact?” by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) was one of the first 
articles bringing mean reversion (MR) up explicitly. They test whether returns over 
different time periods are dependent on each other, contradicting the assumption of i.i.d 
returns. Focusing on stocks having experienced extreme gains (“winners”) or losses 
(“losers”) in the past, they check for longer term mean reverting tendencies. On a data set 
from 1926 to 1982, they find that the losers outperform the winners with a statistical 
significant difference of 24.6% in returns over three years. These results show that the null 
hypothesis of equal expected returns between past winners and losers can be rejected.  
The variance ratio (VR) test as it is used here was first employed in Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988). Using data from 1962 to 1985, they find that the behaviour of weekly 
returns is not consistent with the RW model, especially for smaller cap stocks. They find 
significant positive serial correlation for weekly and monthly portfolio returns. The weekly 
first order serial correlation of their return index is as high as 30 percent. As this may 
sound unpromising for our approach, this is not the case. The estimated autocorrelations of 
the individual securities are generally found to be negative, which would be an attractive 
property to use in our trading strategy.  
Poterba and Summers (1988) analyze whether transitory components account for 
much of the variance in common stock returns. In turn, this could indicate mean reversion. 
They conclude that if mean reverting components exist, the stock market may be much less 
risky than it appears when considering the variance of single-period returns. In their 
results, stock returns are positively serially correlated for short horizons and negatively 
serially correlated for long horizons, accounting for more than 50 percent of the variance in 
monthly returns. This should favour longer term investors, who then should invest more in 
equity. Supporting these results, Fama & French (1988) use regression methods on data 
from 1926 to 1985 finding that for a 3-5 year period, 40 percent of the variance in the 
returns of small firms is predictable, against 25 percent for bigger firms. Like previous 
studies, they conclude that stock prices of smaller firms are more likely to exhibit mean 
reversion than that of bigger firms. Mukherji (2011) uses bootstrap methods4 for both older 
and newer data (1926–1966 and 1967-2007). He concludes that evidence of mean reversion 
has weakened in recent decades, but still persists for US stocks.  
The availability on research papers regarding efficiency on the OSE is sparse. Older 
studies by Jennergren & Korsvold (1974) find signs of weak inefficiency. A more 
                                                     
4 Techniques being used for estimation and re-sampling of sampling distributions. 
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interesting finding is that Norges Bank Investment Management fund reports of mean 
reverting tendencies on international stock exchanges. The mentioned works of Poterba & 
Summers also observe a clear tendency of more mean reversion on smaller stock 
exchanges. This could very well apply to the OSE. 
Main concerns 
Studies have also produced evidence against mean reversion. McQueen (1992) states that 
earlier tests are biased towards old data, and points out the dangers of relying on an 
asymptotic test5 like the VR test. In addition, Pástor & Stambaugh (2012) emphasize that 
variability in non-observables like future expected returns and estimation risk is higher at 
longer horizons, which could offset the effects of mean reversion in the longer run. Both 
studies conclude that longer term stock investors face more volatility than their short term 
companions.  
Through Monte-Carlo simulation, Poterba and Summers (1988) conclude that 
variance ratios are powerful for detecting mean reversion, but has little power against the 
principal alternatives for the RW hypothesis. They demonstrate the difficulty of 
distinguishing the RW from its alternatives, and argue that the only way to handle this 
problem is the collection of more data. Deo and Richardson (2003) show that when the time 
window for the mean reversion increases together with the length of the sampling period, 
the VR statistic becomes increasingly inconsistent6.  
2.2 Contrarian strategies 
A contrarian strategy sells previous winners and buys previous losers in 
anticipation of a mean reverting effect. As stated by Forbes (1996), there is an intuitive link 
between mean reversion and a contrarian strategy trading rule. According to Jensen (1978) 
the EMH is violated if we can exploit reversion tendencies via a net profiting trading rule. 
To estimate the profitability of our approach we have applied an automatic trading 
framework inspired by Faber (2007) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990). Trading rules are based 
on input parameters and mechanical algorithms. The benefit of this approach is the ability 
to handle large datasets, as well as denying any form of subjectivity and biases in our 
trading decisions.  
                                                     
5 When the limiting distributions of a random variable are unknown. 
6 Using our notation, this corresponds to        . 
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For producing buy – and sell signals we have made use of Bollinger bands, as 
presented in Bollinger (1992). Many studies exist on the possible profitability of technical 
analysis indicators, but most have failed to show their ability of producing consistent net 
profits. This is often due to excessive trading activity resulting in overwhelming 
transaction costs. On results being sensitive to parameter values and data-snooping, we 
notice the warnings of Black (1993) and a recent article by Pavlov and Hurn (2012). The 
latter found that after smoothing out and employing a general set of values for their 
considered time window, the strategy producing the “parameter-robust” positive return 
was in fact a contrarian strategy. More recent techniques of similar technical analysis 
include the use of for example stochastic discount factors, as seen in Cochrane (2001) or 
Hansen et.al. (1997). 
2.3 Anomalies 
The amount of research testing the efficient market hypothesis is extensive. In the words of  
Malkiel (2003) “(...) stock markets are far more efficient and far less predictable than some 
recent academic papers would have us believe.” He also states that “markets can be efficient 
even if stock prices exhibit greater volatility than can apparently be explained by 
fundamentals like earnings and dividends.” This is backed up by the belief that markets 
successfully reflect all new information rapidly and accurately. The problem is that the 
correct market response is never observable to us, not even in hindsight; the closest we get 
may be to use ex-post values. Even then, this will just be an agreed upon conventional value 
with no real guarantee for reflecting past true values. We look at two separate cases when 
considering market anomalies further:  
 Irrational investor behaviour contradicting the EMH 
 Seemingly irrational investor behaviour when the EMH still holds 
Investor anomalies 
Economic wisdom tells us to “buy cheap and sell dear”. This sounds appealing and 
straightforward, but it has been shown that judgements are usually made using a 
representativeness heuristic. As stated by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), many will try to 
predict by seeking the closest match to past patterns without regarding the probability of 
matching the pattern. This has also been backed up by experimental evidence, as seen in 
Andreassen and Kraus (1988) or Marimon and Sunder (1993). Daniel et al. (1998) show 
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how individuals exhibit self-attribution and overconfidence in themselves. People tend to 
attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions to their own ability, while less 
favourable outcomes are attributed to bad luck or possible sabotage. They show how this 
implies negative long-lag serial correlation and excess volatility. DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985) also conclude that most people tend to overreact to unexpected and dramatic news 
events. 
There is some evidence for a price-to-price feedback theory. According to Shiller 
(2003), initial speculation will cause prices to go up, benefitting initial speculators. By 
attracting attention, word-of-mouth enthusiasm and in-hindsight “new era” theories, 
expectations for the considered asset are once again heightened. During more rounds of 
positive feedback, this gives rise to a speculative bubble. We now have high expectations 
for future price increases, justifying the very high price level of the asset. This expectation-
driven rapid increase in the price level cannot be sustainable in the longer run. The bubble 
eventually bursts, causing prices to fall drastically. A famous example of this is the Dutch 
tulip mania and following market crash in the 1630s. Following the same psychology we 
may now see a similar negative spiral, again driving values away from its relevant 
fundamentals. It then appears that the tendency of relying on empirical data, self-
attribution and the return chasing nature of investors may cause the observed anomalies of 
the stock market. 
Observing seemingly irrational behaviour in an efficient market 
This part covers a more optimistic view on behalf of the investor. While observing 
deviations from the EMH, there could still be possible explanations for this behaviour to be 
rational. Main consensus has been that rational speculators must stabilize stock prices. 
Buying when prices are relatively low and selling when prices are high puts upwards and 
downwards pressure on the current price, respectively. In other words, rational speculators 
cause mean reversion through a negative feedback mechanism. 
In the presence of a positive feedback mechanism, rational speculation can be 
destabilizing. When rational investors receive good news and prepare to trade on this, they 
anticipate that the price increase from the initial level will trigger positive feedback traders 
to buy the next day. As a response, the rational investors buy more than the news actually 
calls for. The next day, positive feedback traders buy in response to the price increase, 
keeping price above fundamental values even after rational speculators sell out to profit. 
The forward-looking rational speculators anticipate the trending behaviour of the market, 
and magnify the overall trading reaction by buying more than warranted for by the initial 
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news. Long et al.(1990) conclude that rational behaviour by investors may increase market 
volatility. Note that this is only partly able to rationalise the behaviour of investors in the 
market, as someone (here; the positive feedback traders) has to be on the losing end once 
the bubble bursts and prices revert back. 
Fama and French (1988) argue that the predictability of returns could also be the 
result of time-varying equilibrium expected returns. These may very well be generated by 
rational pricing in an efficient market. One example is the estimated risk premium, as seen 
in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)7. They conclude that the cumulative effect of 
shocks in the expected returns must be exactly offset by an opposite adjustment in the 
current price. This highlights the downside of applying time-series tests of market 
efficiency; irrational price bubbles are indistinguishable from rational time-varying 
expected returns.  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Our approach 
Numerous studies have been examining the possibility of imperfect capital markets. 
In many of these studies, the link between theory and practice may seem unclear. In this 
paper we take a more practical approach, resulting in a twofold paper. We will first provide 
examples of some of our data, and then explain how we want to investigate and possibly 
exploit these. First we use a theoretical approach to indicate possible mean reverting 
tendencies. Secondly, this approach is tested in practice by simulating its performance. 
The relationship between the variance ratio and the success of a contrarian trading 
strategy is of small practical value if there is no predictability in the variance ratio. If VR 
patterns persist, we could form portfolios out of stocks that have showed mean reverting 
patterns in the previous period. To test this we will investigate the contrarian success of 
portfolios that showed significantly low VRs in the previous period. We will also 
investigate whether the market cap and liquidity of a stock possess predicative power of 
exploitable patterns. More details on these characteristics are described in section 3.4. 
                                                     
7                       , where            is the time-varying estimated risk premium. 
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3.2 Mean reversion 
Besides the random walk model, two alternatives are considered for explaining the 
development pattern of a stock price. If the price increases and the stock price exhibits 
mean reversion, the price is expected to revert back towards its fundamental value. This 
corresponds to the stock exhibiting negative serial correlation. On the other hand, the price 
pattern can be based on momentum; the price of the stock is likely to keep moving in the 
same direction rather than to change direction. This corresponds to exhibiting positive 
serial correlation. The term fundamental value might appear a bit vague. Here it proxies the 
 -period moving average. This will be explained in more detail in the next sections. 
A stock price can exhibit different development patterns for different time horizons. 
For example, the price of a stock may overreact to short-term shocks, causing momentum 
for shorter time windows. It may also display mean reversion in the longer run if these 
short term shocks tend to wear off after a certain time period. Thus, momentum and mean 
reversion are only mutually exclusive over the same time windows. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 3.2.1. 
Figure 3.2.1 Shorter term momentum and mean reversion in the longer term 
 
The dashed arrows illustrate periods of momentum (*) in stock price development for Farstad Shipping (FAR). The solid line is a one 
year simple moving average which the stock price reverts back to both year-end 2001 and 2002 (**).  In several shorter term periods 
FAR stock price exhibit momentum properties, while it continues to revert towards its one-year moving average in the longer run. 
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The random walk model 
The efficient market hypothesis assumes that prices follow random walks. If this holds true, 
it is not possible to obtain excess profits by modelling future stock price movements. We 
challenge this debated theory with the objective to profit from a contrarian strategy. If an 
empirical approach proves beneficial, it could imply that the weak form efficiency does not 
hold for the OSE. One model describing efficient pricing is the geometric Brownian motion 
(gBm)8. We will here treat the gBm as a continuous-time variant of the random walk9.  
   
  
                      
   is the stock price,    is its percentage drift rate and    is the volatility over the considered 
time interval   .     is a standard Brownian motion  √   where        
  . By solving the 
equation for    we get 
       
 ̂                 ̂     
 
 
   
  
using logs we get 
                 ̂          
which yields 
                     
       
The variance of the logged stock price movements must be linearly increasing in the time 
interval. In other words, the variance in returns over   days should not be different from   
times the one-day variance. From now on, we will use   as notation for the (daily) length of 
the mean reverting cycle. 
  
                                                     
8 A stochastic differential equation used in mathematical finance, e.g. as in the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. See 
Wilmott (2007) for an introduction to the topic. 
9 As showed by Sottinen (2001), the discrete-time RW model converges to a Brownian model as    approaches zero. 
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The Variance Ratio test 
The variance ratio test investigates if this property holds true. It provides a simple 
specification test based on the variance in returns, testing the above stated assumption of 
linearity in returns. If consistently able to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk, 
there could still be room for earning profits by modelling stock price patterns. The main 
strengths of this test is that is intuitively comprehensible, it requires little computational 
power, and has through Monte-Carlo simulation proved to be more reliable than other 
comparable statistic tests like the Dickey-Fuller t-test and the Box-Pierce Q test10. As 
there exist general consensus that stock market volatility changes over time, it is also 
worth noting that the VR test under certain assumptions is robust to heteroscedasticity. 
Defining                   , the variance ratio can be formulated as 
      
                     
         
    ∑
     
 
   
   
   
 
The first term compares the total period (numerator) and k times the daily (denominator) 
volatility of individual stocks. When the daily return volatility is high compared to that of 
the total period11, it would seem that the shorter term variance is overstated. This is what 
we want to exploit with our mean reverting strategy, and corresponds to a low       
statistic. For the second term    is the jth lag serial correlation coefficient of the returns. 
We want to test the null hypothesis that the log stock price and its first difference, the 
returns, is a collection of i.i.d. observations. When returns are uncorrelated over time, we 
should have        . A variance ratio significantly less than 1 reveals possible mean 
reverting tendencies for the stock. A variance ratio significantly greater than 1 could 
indicate momentum behaviour. As mentioned earlier, focus will be on findings of the former 
case. 
One should also be aware of some shortcomings of the VR test as a tool for 
predictive purposes. The calculated variance ratios are positively skewed, as the variances 
cannot be negative. This causes the variance ratios to have a lower bound of zero, while all 
positive values are theoretically possible. Both Poterba and Summers (1987) and Deo and 
Richardson (2003) point out that this has implications for the power of the test when   
increases relative to the number of observations  . The rejection of a random walk does not 
offer any explicit guidance towards a more credible model. For example, the alternative of 
                                                     
10 Lo and MacKinlay (1989) 
11 The variance ratio in terms of prices can be written as                                   
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an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process states that the speed of reversion depends on the deviation 
from the mean12. If this would be a more precise formulation, its properties would be a 
valuable attribute in our trading strategy. But for the time being, we leave this alternative 
as a subject for future research. 
3.3 Contrarian strategies 
Having an idea of which stocks and for which time windows we have mean reverting 
tendencies, we test whether an exploiting trading algorithm makes excess profits. This is 
done to confirm or disconfirm that the variance ratio measure indicates success of a 
contrarian strategy. The profits we try to obtain can be illustrated as in Figure 3.3.1. 
Figure 3.3.1 Illustrating scope for profits using a contrarian strategy 
 
The top chart displays the FAR stock price in orange with a one year moving average as the black line in the period 2001/2002. Trading 
positions that are taken in our contrarian strategy are set to be closed when the stock price crosses the moving average which is the 
middle band. The distance between the price and the moving average therefore indicates scope for profits at the point of time considered. 
We make use of what we refer to as modified Bollinger bands. The modification is due to the 
inclusion of estimated transaction costs as part of the trading band, trying to avoid 
undertaking trades where these costs are expected to outweigh that of the expected return 
on the trade. The strategy itself is made out of a trading algorithm, for which the 
framework is rigid yet simple13. The trading algorithm is a precise recipe that specifies the 
exact sequence of steps required to simulate the trading strategy. It provides for simulation 
of large datasets while keeping behavioural biases and possible suspected data mining to a 
minimum. The algorithm opens positions using buy/sell indicators that are triggered by 
                                                     
12                      
13 See Appendix A.5 for the formulations of the trading signals in the quantitative model framework. 
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trading signals. The weight of each position will be dependent on the available number of 
tradable shares and the total current value of the portfolio. In other words, all initiated 
trades are given equal weights in terms of current portfolio value14. 
By using this approach, we are assuming that the movements in the stock price are 
“noise” around the fundamental value. Otherwise they are outcomes of changing market 
conditions for the stock, in which case the market would be correct to make a price 
correction. This could lead to lacking or inappropriate responses from our side. 
Transaction costs 
An important feature of real-world trading is transaction costs. Many strategies could have 
potential of achieving excess profits, but these strategies seldom survive after accounting 
for imposed costs. Often this comes from over extensive trading. According to Ødegaard 
(2008), most of the direct trading costs arise from the relative bid-ask spread15. On average, 
the percentage cost of a round-trip (one open and one close) is equal to this measure. The 
transaction cost   is therefore equal to the average relative bid-ask spread in addition to a 
minor brokerage fee of 0.1%. These costs are incorporated into our trading algorithm, 
aiming to account for the issue of over-trading. Each stock does  
not face its own real-time individual transaction costs in our simulations. Due to unstable 
bid-ask data and programming issues, transaction cost is calculated as the broad daily 
average of all considered stocks. 
Bollinger bands 
Existence of a mean reverting component in the stock price is in itself not enough to 
develop a complete trading strategy. We also need a framework for producing trading 
signals. Bollinger bands construct trading bands around the price path of the stock, 
creating upper and lower bands indicating whether prices are high or low on a relative 
basis. When the stock price crosses outside of the band, a trading signal is made. A signal 
of a high price will initiate a short position, and a signal of a low price will initiate a long 
position. A position is closed when the price reverts back to its moving average. The size of 
the band range is determined by the time-varying volatility of the stock.  
The technique makes use of basic measures like the simple moving average and 
standard deviations, and is applicable to any market or security. The standard value for 
                                                     
14 Formally, the size of each position is given by                                                          
15 The relative bid – ask spread (rBAs) is                        , so total transaction costs            . 
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triggering a trade signal is two standard deviations, which will also be used here16. As even 
stated by its proponents, it must be emphasized that these indicators in themselves do not 
make absolute buy or sell signals. Combined with the proposed tendency of overstated 
volatility, they may contain exploitable information. Transaction costs are attached into the 
bands. As mentioned previously, this is a way to prevent excessive trading and transaction 
costs. For a higher transaction cost, there must also be percentagewise higher expected 
return to take the trade. This can be seen in Figure 3.3.2. 
For each trade, we must also be able to formulate what price path (and hence; what 
returns) we expect to develop over the time window of  . The solution of the random walk-
modelling gBm earlier gives us 
 [  (      )]     (    )   ̂          
which again yields17 
 [    ]        (   ̂         ) 
As the simple moving average is a proxy for the true fundamental value of the price, we get 
 [    ]         (   ̂         )  
In addition to returning towards its moving average, we also expect the price to increase 
by a drift term over   days. It is important to note that the length of the mean reverting 
time window   for each stock will be equal to the time window for which we found MR 
tendencies in the VR test. E.g. if results are indicating MR tendencies for a  -value of 32 
days for a stock, Bollinger bands will also be calculated on a basis of 32-day moving 
averages and standard deviations. These will be denoted as       and      respectively.  
                                  ̂           
              
           
      ̂          
  
                                                     
16 Some increases the no. of standard deviations as   increases, but there seems to lack consensus for  -values over 50. 
17 Note that    is already defined as the percentage drift rate of the stock price. 
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Figure 3.3.2 The effect of modification to standard Bollinger bands18 
 
The two charts show SANG stock price development in 2001/2002-07 coloured in orange. The top chart has standard Bollinger bands 
shaded around the stock price while the bottom chart has modified Bollinger bands that are wider. In the top chart we see that the stock 
price cross the outer bands at several times (*). This would have produced more than the single pair of one trading and close signal 
indicated as red and green triangles, respectively a short signal in Feb 2002 and a close position signal in June 2002. In the bottom chart 
we see that the modified Bollinger bands isolate those potential signals above, allowing only for the single trade mentioned. (**)  
 
Riding the bands 
A longer-lasting persistent price shock may induce what is called “Riding the bands”, if the 
momentum is strong enough. This will cause volatility to increase, and the price may stay 
outside of its bands during the upturn (fall). A contrarian strategy will react by rapidly 
trying to short (buy) the stock. If this process goes on unhindered, it may cause significant 
losses as we initiate increasingly larger positions in losing investments.  
As a way to mitigate this problem, we do not allow for subsequent buying/shorting 
of the same stock before the position is closed. In this way we help to control the downside 
of our investments. Our investments still have a limited upside but a larger downside, as 
the price always reacts faster than the moving average curve. For the upside, the reverting 
price must sooner or later cross the moving average, and the profit is realised. For the 
downside, this does not need to be the case. If the price keeps moving rapidly in the same 
direction, the moving average may not catch up. A short position will then have an infinite 
                                                     
18 When the band is crossed we have                  
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downside (as a price has no upper bound), while a long position will have a downside equal 
to the size of the initial investment19. An infinite downside is not realistic, but the general 
concept of potential great losses still applies. One way to mitigate some of this risk is to use 
stop-loss rules. But following our mean reverting train of thought and to avoid further 
complexity, no restrictions will be considered here. 
 
Portfolio details 
It is assumed ability to trade on all days. All trades are initiated at the end of the day of the 
trading signal. The trading strategies employed consider each stock separately. This means 
that even as the securities are tested collectively as a portfolio, they are all objects to their 
own independent trading algorithm. The portfolios have no initial positions, and can be 
characterized as null portfolios. We still regard the trading as if we have initial long 
positions in addition to actively adjusting the positions a proportion up (buy) or down (sell) 
based on trading signals. This allows us to consider our null portfolio performance as net 
performance over a passive long portfolio performance. A net negative position does not 
necessarily constitute a short-sale; it indicates the deviation from a passive holding 
portfolio. As a result, a net short/selling position imposes no additional cost over taking a 
long position. Long positions are financed by borrowing money and cash flows from 
“short” positions are put into a liquid risk free investment20. 
3.4 Portfolio selection 
It is interesting to check if any particular stock characteristics seem to influence its 
performance in a contrarian strategy. We will rank the suggested stock characteristics into 
two different portfolios, one top and one bottom portfolio. We then use the difference in 
results from these portfolios to explore possible systematic patterns that could indicate a 
relation to mean-reverting behaviour.  
VR sorted portfolios 
Applying the trading algorithm on stock price series with the most desirable VR test 
statistics, does the success of the contrarian strategy increase with the observed statistic? It 
would then appear that the variance ratio measure is appropriate for trading purposes. 
                                                     
19 A practical example of this is illustrated in section 5.4. 
20 The risk free rate will be equal the 3-month NIBOR rate, and is the same for both borrowing and lending. 
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Short vs. long term mean reversion 
From earlier literature, mean reversion has shown to be more present over the long term 
rather than the shorter term. One of the important features of a longer investment horizon 
is the increase in absolute risk21. The scope for profits will be higher, but the same will also 
be the case for losses. A longer time horizon gives the market more time to return back to 
its fundamental value if the price pattern is dependent on underlying (but hopefully mean 
reverting) components. Common examples could be market interest rates or business 
cycles. 
Market cap sorted portfolios 
Earlier studies have found small cap stocks to exhibit mean reversion. One explanation for 
this is that these stocks do not receive as much attention as others in the market, and the 
probability of erratic and seemingly irrational behaviour in prices could increase relative to 
others. 
Liquidity sorted portfolios 
The liquidity of a stock could relate to mean reversion tendencies. It is known that the 
liquidity of a stock is reflected in the trading cost22. As the bid-ask spread is a large 
component of the trading cost, it provides us with a good estimator for the liquidity of a 
stock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
21 To see this, see for example the last equation on p.9. 
22 E.g. as stated by Foster and Viswanathan (1993). 
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4. Data  
4.1 Børsprosjektet 
All of the empirical data used in our dataset are collected from NHH’s database, 
Børsprosjektet. The database contains daily Norwegian equity price data from 1984 and 
onwards. All prices have been adjusted for dividends and splits. Taxes and possible slippage 
are not included. 
Oslo Axess 
The opening of Oslo Axess in May 2007 gave smaller and medium size companies with 
growth ambitions opportunities to access an authorised and fully regulated marketplace 
with venture capital. The requirements for admission to listing on Oslo Axess are less 
detailed than for Oslo Børs. For our data period this marketplace has a short history with 
generally less mature and infrequently traded securities. We exclude securities listed on 
Oslo Axess from the dataset and focus on the larger and more stable history from Oslo 
Børs. Therefore, we disregard Oslo Axess when we refer to the OSE. 
4.2 Data overview 
The data set ranges from the January 1993 to December 2012. We consider this period 
appropriate as markets had settled after introduction of the electronic order book system in 
1988, and it also includes the turbulences of the 1990s and 2000s. We will look at blocks of 
four year sub periods, leaving us with five sub periods in total. 
If a stock enters or exits the exchange during a sub period, it is not included23 – 
only full datasets for a sub period are considered. All stocks must have a price of at least 
NOK 10 exiting the previous sub period24. It is very challenging to produce net profits 
from trading high transaction cost stocks. As a result, stocks having an average relative 
bid-ask spread of over five percent over the previous sub period are also excluded. The 
remaining dataset contains daily observations of 144 unique stocks. A brief summary of 
these can be seen in Table 4.2. 
  
                                                     
23 The requirement of complete time-series is a programming issue. See explanation in section 4.4. 
24 These are criterias also used in Ødegaard (2012). 
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Table 4.2 Sample statistics 
Period 
Number 
of trading 
days,   
Number of stocks 
listed excluding 
Oslo Axess 
Number of 
stocks listed 
throughout period 
Number of stocks listed throughout with 
- price 
above 10 
- relative 
bid-ask < 5% 
- all criterias met: 
our selection 
1993-1996 1006 254 59 46 32 21 
1997-2000 1004 314 129 98 83 72 
2001-2004 1001 278 144 119 80 71 
2005-2008 1006 311 143 98 118 78 
2009-2012 1007 251 172 84 119 72 
The table presents sample statistics from the dataset obtained from Børsprosjektet. We have divided the sample into 5 sub periods of 4 
years length, with   number of trading days. The starting point for our sample selection is the total number of stocks that appear in each 
sub period excluding Oslo Axess. First we require that stocks must be listed throughout the whole sub period. The last observed price 
for the previous sub period must be above 10 NOK and the average relative bid-ask spread cannot exceed 5%. 
A time window of four years is well suited for VR tests for up to one year, yielding a 
maximum     ratio of 1/425. This is below the recommendation of a ratio not exceeding 
1/3 to ensure adequate sample size for the VR test. The use of different sub periods allows 
us to check for development patterns by comparing these periods up against each other. 
On performance sensitivity, a sizeable number of considered stocks and trading 
signals should provide a robust number of trading observations. For simplicity, the total 
performances of whole portfolios rather than for individual stocks are reported. 
4.3 Data biases 
The removal of incomplete time-series leads to forward-looking and possible survivorship 
bias in our data. Withdrawals from the exchange could be due to mergers and 
bankruptcy26. Excluding several smaller and less liquid stocks may cause some lack of 
external validity for the OSE as a whole. Ødegaard (2007) states that OSE is influenced by 
the positive “January effect”. This could inflict some minor bias in our trade simulations. 
4.4 Implementation and programming 
Originally we planned to use Excel as our main tool to organise and prepare our data for 
testing and simulation. While planning research methods our supervisor introduced us to 
the VR test package in R. R is a programming language and environment for statistical 
computing and graphics. Its free software is of growing popularity and turned out to be the 
primary workhorse for all the tasks we have performed on our dataset. Neither of us had 
any previous experience with R, and at first the learning process was demanding. However, 
we soon realised Excel’s limitations to processing of larger data frames. After making a 
considerable time investment we harvested great benefits from power in data preparation, 
analysis and computational efficiency.  
                                                     
25 For                          
26 In our original dataset, bankruptcies are rare. We do however expect a stock price to reflect this risk if present. 
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Besides the ‘vrtest’ package (Kim, 2010) we have used a quantitative strategy model 
framework found within the ‘quantstrat’ package (Carl et. al., 2013). This package has 
enabled us to implement the trading strategy and produce evaluation results. The model 
still has a couple of shortcomings that we were unable to program around. It cannot handle 
incomplete time-series and we were therefore bound to be forward looking and exclude 
price series that were unlisted during a period. A smaller programming issue is the inability 
to implement the individual transaction costs for each stock. As a compromise, we used a 
daily average for all stocks. 
5. Results  
5.1 The variance ratio test 
The variance ratio test is applied for all sub periods using  -values of 32, 64, 128 and 256. 
The complete results for the standardized test statistics are supplied in Appendix A.1, and a 
summary can be seen in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Summary of VR test results. No. of stocks with a significantly low test statistic 
Period k=32 k=64 k=128 k=256 Universe of stocks in sub period 
1993-1996 3 (14%) 1 (05%) 4 (19%) 0 (00%) 21 
1997-2000 17 (24%) 16 (22%) 17 (24%) 19 (26% 72 
2001-2004 15 (21%) 10 (14%) 6 (08%) 11 (15%) 71 
2005-2008 7 (09%) 7 (09%) 5 (06%) 5 (06%) 78 
2009-2012 27 (38%) 19 (26%) 12 (17%) 21 (29%) 72 
We calculate log returns of stock prices and apply the VR test to all stocks in each sub periods. When testing k-period=32 the critical 
value is -1.5 and stocks with lower test-statistics than -1.5 are then considered significant over 32-day periods. I.e. 3 stocks had a 
significant test-statistic for k=32 in sub period 1993-1996 (equalling 14% of the total number of stocks). The rest of the numbers are 
found in the same manner for the other k-values. Individual test statistics for all stocks and the critical values are reported in Appendix 
A.1. 
Price patterns showing a significantly low variance ratio deviates from a random walk, 
possibly in favour of a mean reverting alternative. These will be our main candidates for 
the contrarian trading algorithm. The number of significant findings does not seem to 
decrease with the value of  . This indicates that our proposed    -ratio of maximum 1/4 is 
sufficient to ensure decent power of the variance ratio test. The efficient market hypothesis 
assumption of i.i.d. returns can be rejected for at least one stock price for all sub periods 
and  -values but one. In the small dataset from 1993–1996, only a few stocks show a 
significantly low variance ratio. For the later sub periods, the number of deviating stock 
price patterns varies. Almost 25% of the stocks in 1997–2000 are rejected to follow a 
random walk. This number falls to below 15% for 2001-2004, and as low as 6% during 
2005–2008. It increases sharply in the most recent sub period from 2009 to 2012. 
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5.2 Portfolio performance 
Portfolios are split into top and bottom segments. First, the average net daily profit & loss 
and daily standard deviations are reported. The Sharpe ratio is calculated by dividing the 
daily net portfolio returns by its standard deviations. A higher Sharpe ratio means a higher 
reward-to-risk ratio. We also report the percentage maximum drawdown and transaction 
costs for each portfolio27. The approximate gross profit before transaction cost is found by 
adding the transaction costs back to the net profit28.  
Portfolios sorted by hindsight variance ratios 
The results of this section answer whether the variance ratio relates to the success of a 
contrarian trading strategy. The performances of the top and bottom portfolios in terms of 
the observed variance ratio are reported in Table 5.2.1. 
Table 5.2.1 Performance of portfolios sorted by VR in hindsight 
Period Daily Net P&L NOK Daily   NOK Sharpe NOK Max Drawdown % Daily trading cost NOK 
k Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   
1993-1996                
32 -217 -298 81 2147 2487 -340 -0.101 -0.120 0.019 0.247 0.334 -0.088 116 137 -21 
64 -111 -311 199 2196 2717 -521 -0.051 -0.114 0.064 0.155 0.437 -0.283 72 62 10 
128 -56 -307 251 2268 3041 -773 -0.025 -0.101 0.076 0.201 0.510 -0.309 35 32 3 
256 -31 -237 206 1460 2204 -744 -0.021 -0.107 0.086 0.141 0.428 -0.287 8 5 3 
 
1997-2000 
               
32 -123 -293 170 1684 2775 -1091 -0.073 -0.105 0.032 0.148 0.367 -0.218 154 186 -32 
64 -48 -332 285 1675 3330 -1655 -0.028 -0.100 0.071 0.121 0.472 -0.351 87 103 -16 
128 14 -316 330 1994 3129 -1135 0.007 -0.101 0.108 0.103 0.441 -0.338 49 100 -51 
256 24 1 24 1405 3145 -1740 0.017 0.000 0.017 0.063 0.153 -0.090 16 25 -9 
 
2001-2004 
               
32 -217 -559 343 2076 3579 -1503 -0.104 -0.156 0.052 0.225 0.531 -0.306 198 238 -40 
64 -147 -704 557 2141 5075 -2934 -0.068 -0.139 0.070 0.162 0.784 -0.622 120 83 37 
128 -17 -694 678 2258 5726 -3468 -0.007 -0.121 0.114 0.148 0.770 -0.622 74 70 4 
256 -39 -297 258 1659 4776 -3117 -0.024 -0.062 0.039 0.190 0.493 -0.303 20 28 -8 
 
2005-2008 
               
32 -76 -435 359 2910 3837 -927 -0.026 -0.113 0.087 0.178 0.516 -0.338 87 132 -45 
64 -107 -466 359 2839 4203 -1364 -0.038 -0.111 0.073 0.162 0.601 -0.439 68 70 -2 
128 -96 -382 286 3148 4837 -1689 -0.030 -0.079 0.048 0.167 0.562 -0.395 33 37 -4 
256 -60 -226 165 2158 3693 -1535 -0.028 -0.061 0.033 0.156 0.415 -0.259 13 13 0 
 
2009-2012 
               
32 -31 -348 316 2097 2854 -757 -0.015 -0.122 0.107 0.090 0.421 -0.331 135 143 -8 
64 -54 -359 305 2238 3045 -807 -0.024 -0.118 0.094 0.128 0.504 -0.376 72 79 -7 
128 37 -136 173 1764 3144 -1380 0.021 -0.043 0.064 0.070 0.309 -0.239 30 39 -9 
256 47 -9 56 922 1779 -857 0.051 -0.005 0.056 0.035 0.131 -0.096 8 12 -4 
All portfolios are actively managed by an automatic trading algorithm. For each k-value in all sub periods we simulate performance for 
portfolios sorted by VR in hindsight. This includes 40 simulations (4 k-values x 5 sub periods x 2 sorted portfolios). The stocks with the 
lowest VR statistics are included in the Top portfolio. The other half of the stocks forms the Bottom portfolio. The Sharpe ratio NOK is 
calculated as the average Daily Net Profit & Loss relative to the Daily standard deviation NOK. Maximum drawdown % is calculated as the 
largest drawdown from peak equity attained throughout the trading period. The delta column (∆) is the difference between results in top 
and bottom portfolios. 
                                                     
27 The percentage is calculated from an initial available capital of one million, but its nominal value is not too relevant in 
our approach. It shows the maximum peak-to-trough decline for the portfolio during the period. 
28 This approximation ignores the risk free returns, as these are rather low on a daily basis. The net profits include the 
returns from the risk free investments minus transaction costs.  
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Top portfolios are the half of stocks with the desirable low variance ratios, while 
stocks with higher variance ratios are in the bottom segment. The results are not promising 
in terms of beating the market. Only in four out of the twenty sub periods, the top portfolio 
is able to obtain a relatively small positive profit net of transaction costs. We see that the 
impact of transaction costs do affect the returns by a substantial amount. Many of the 
experienced losses are showing a negative gross return even before these costs. This could 
be an effect of including as many as half of the stocks for each strategy. Testing this by 
only allowing stocks with statistically low significant variance ratios to be traded increases 
profitability, but still falls short of making net profits in 12 out of the 19 sub periods.  
Results show indications of a relationship between the variance ratios and the 
success of contrarian strategies. Out of four different time horizons over five different time 
periods, the top portfolios outperform their bottom counterparts in all sub periods. The 
average daily return is consistently higher for these portfolios than for the bottom 
portfolios. There is also a tendency regarding the volatilities of the portfolios. The 
standard deviations are lower for the top portfolios than for their counterparts. Combined 
with the higher daily return, the calculated Sharpe ratios must also be higher. The Sharpe 
ratios range between 0.05 for the best and almost -0.2 for the worst performing portfolios. 
Considering the maximum drawdown of the portfolios, the same pattern is observed. The 
maximum percentage drawdowns are lower for the top portfolios than for the bottom 
portfolios. This might not come as a surprise due to the overall superior returns. In 
addition, there seems to exist a weak tendency for net profits to increase as the variance 
ratio   -value increases. This is described in more detail in the next section. 
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Short vs. long term mean reversion 
The results of this section answer whether the length of the mean reverting time 
window   relates to the success of a contrarian trading strategy. Table 5.2.2 reports 
performances in terms of the considered   value for each time period. 
Table 5.2.2 Performance of stock universe portfolio 
Period 
k 
Daily 
Net P&L 
NOK 
Daily   
NOK 
Sharpe 
NOK 
Max 
Draw- 
down %  
Daily 
Transaction 
Cost 
Daily 
Gross P&L 
NOK 
Number 
of trades 
per stock 
   to 
passive 
portfolio 
1993-1996         
32 -276 1893 -0.146 0.295 136 -140 18.0 -0.27 
64 -215 1970 -0.109 0.303 66 -149 10.1 -0.26 
128 -182 2154 -0.084 0.343 33 -149 5.0 -0.32 
256 -139 1470 -0.094 0.288 6 -133 1.0 -0.17 
 
1997-2000 
        
32 -151 1998 -0.075 0.271 114 -37 26.5 -0.01 
64 -197 2154 -0.091 0.295 92 -105 12.2 -0.02 
128 -103 2332 -0.044 0.172 50 -53 6.5 -0.02 
256 12 1923 0.006 0.090 20 32 2.5 0.03 
 
2001-2004 
        
32 -396 2454 -0.161 0.380 221 -175 19.4 0.14 
64 -447 3170 -0.141 0.544 129 -318 11.4 0.10 
128 -375 3754 -0.100 0.547 73 -302 6.1 -0.04 
256 -170 2871 -0.059 0.322 24 -146 2.0 -0.11 
 
2005-2008 
        
32 -269 2990 -0.090 0.332 125 -144 24.5 0.18 
64 -291 3197 -0.091 0.406 67 -224 13.1 0.16 
128 -237 3557 -0.067 0.384 34 -203 6.4 0.06 
256 -142 2673 -0.053 0.284 13 -129 2.4 0.10 
 
2009-2012 
        
32 -195 2295 -0.085 0.231 141 -54 22.5 0.02 
64 -212 2430 -0.087 0.346 76 -136 12.4 0.02 
128 -52 2198 -0.023 0.167 35 -17 5.5 0.02 
256 19 1175 0.016 0.063 10 29 1.6 0.03 
All portfolios are actively managed by an automatic trading algorithm. For each k-value in all sub periods we simulate portfolio 
performance .This includes 20 simulations (4k-values x 5sub periods x 1portfolio). The Sharpe ratio NOK is calculated as the average 
Daily Net Profit & Loss relative to the Daily standard deviation NOK. Maximum drawdown % is calculated as the largest drawdown from 
peak equity attained throughout the trading period. The column of Daily Gross Profit & Loss NOK is the sum of Daily Net Profit & Loss 
and Daily Transaction cost. The beta measure is the systematic risk of the active portfolio compared to a passive buy and hold portfolio. 
The table is not divided into top and bottom portfolios, as we want to observe the isolated 
effect of increasing the mean reverting time windows. All available stocks are therefore 
included. There is a tendency of Sharpe ratios to rise as   increases. Much of the increase in 
the Sharpe ratio as   increases is due to reduced transaction costs. This comes from more 
frequent trading per stock for smaller   values. Looking at the standard deviations and the 
maximum drawdowns, it does not exist tendencies that are strong enough to be considered 
as a describable pattern. Overall, our results suggest that trading on longer term MR 
tendencies looks more efficient than for the shorter term due to improved accuracy and 
lower trading activity.  
 
Another interesting measure is the systematic risk, to which degree the returns 
from the active portfolios respond to swings in the market. Beta coefficients are calculated 
          L-E. Nordby, J. Firman / Can Price Reversals in Oslo Stock Exchange be Exploited?           23 
 
against a passive buy and hold strategy picked from the same stock universe29. Our results 
show patterns of some systematic risk. For the small number of stocks in the first period, 
coefficients are as low as -0.26 on average. This indicates that we carry substantial negative 
systematic risk. Our portfolios should then be expected to do well in a bearish market, and 
accordingly bad in a bullish market. This is well in line with our negative results for this 
period, as OSE was in a bullish phase at the time. For 1997-2004, the results are varying 
but relatively weak. Portfolios move in direction with the market in the period of 2005-
2008. In the last period of 2009-2012 beta values never rise above 0.03. Low beta values are 
also the case for our more specific portfolios, showing relatively small signs of systematic 
risk. We conclude that only a small part of the success or shortfalls of our strategy can be 
attributed to swings in the market. 
Portfolios sorted by market capitalisation 
The results of this section answer whether the market cap of the stocks relates to the 
success of a contrarian trading strategy. The performances of our market cap sorted 
portfolios are presented in Table 5.2.3. 
Table 5.2.3 Performance of portfolios sorted by market cap 
Period Daily Net P&L NOK Daily   NOK Sharpe NOK Max Drawdown % Daily trading cost NOK 
k Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   
1997-2000                
32 -268 -161 -107 3231 2620 611 -0.083 -0.061 -0.021 0.340 0.290 0.050 162 146 16 
64 -195 -223 28 3614 3165 449 -0.054 -0.071 0.017 0.320 0.368 -0.048 102 77 25 
128 -61 -99 38 3761 2945 816 -0.016 -0.034 0.017 0.219 0.283 -0.064 58 41 17 
256 108 -16 124 3706 2144 1562 0.029 -0.007 0.036 0.147 0.110 0.036 30 14 16 
 
2001-2004 
               
32 -398 -255 -142 3345 1907 1438 -0.119 -0.134 0.015 0.389 0.269 0.120 216 143 73 
64 -350 -335 -15 3310 2773 537 -0.106 -0.121 0.015 0.423 0.445 -0.022 126 110 16 
128 -303 -294 -9 3387 2967 420 -0.089 -0.099 0.010 0.419 0.451 -0.033 64 55 9 
256 -86 -157 71 2559 1945 614 -0.034 -0.081 0.047 0.173 0.312 -0.139 24 16 8 
 
2005-2008 
               
32 -175 -204 29 3756 2723 1033 -0.046 -0.075 0.029 0.261 0.269 -0.008 129 121 8 
64 -192 -247 55 3892 2827 1065 -0.049 -0.087 0.038 0.323 0.360 -0.037 68 62 6 
128 -141 -187 47 4186 3012 1174 -0.034 -0.062 0.029 0.301 0.341 -0.039 34 31 3 
256 -169 -143 -26 3402 2356 1046 -0.050 -0.061 0.011 0.336 0.297 0.038 12 10 2 
 
2009-2012 
               
32 -96 -233 138 3010 2078 932 -0.032 -0.112 0.081 0.162 0.239 -0.076 126 143 -17 
64 -88 -205 117 3195 2186 1009 -0.028 -0.094 0.066 0.233 0.290 -0.058 75 74 1 
128 -8 -35 28 2744 1860 884 -0.003 -0.019 0.016 0.141 0.105 0.036 32 33 -1 
256 21 24 -3 1461 947 514 0.014 0.025 -0.011 0.075 0.062 0.014 8 9 -1 
All portfolios are actively managed by an automatic trading algorithm. For each k-value in the 4 out of sample sub periods we simulate 
performance for portfolios sorted by market cap. This includes 32 simulations (4k-values x 4sub periods x 2sorted portfolios). The stocks 
with the highest market caps are included in the Top portfolio. The other half of the stocks forms the Bottom portfolio. The Sharpe ratio 
NOK is calculated as the Daily Net Profit & Loss relative to the Daily standard deviation NOK. Maximum drawdown % is calculated as the 
largest drawdown from peak equity attained throughout the trading period. The delta column (∆) is the difference between results in top 
and bottom portfolios.  
                                                     
29 Betas between our passive universes and the Oslo All Share Index are generally calculated to be a little less than unity. 
This means that our considered stocks can be considered to be representative for the market as a whole. 
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Top are higher-half market cap stocks, while bottom are the lower-halves. Unlike previous 
studies, no tendency of smaller cap stocks outperforming bigger stocks is seen. This is not 
too surprising as there are two significant differences between our study and those 
mentioned earlier. Our maximum time window of one year is shorter than time windows 
used in earlier studies. For our time windows, neither did they find signs of exploitable 
mean reverting price patterns. These were also done on other stock exchanges, using older 
datasets. The different methods, economic climates and the use of more recent data on our 
part could very well account for the differences in results. Standard deviations for the top 
portfolios are clearly higher than their counterparts, causing many of its (mostly negative) 
Sharpe ratios to be higher than for the smaller stocks. Differences in the maximum 
drawdown are varying, without signs of a recognisable pattern. 
Portfolios sorted by relative bid-ask spread 
The results of this section answer whether the liquidity of the stock (approximated by the 
rBAs) relates to the success of a contrarian trading strategy. The performances of our 
liquidity sorted portfolios are presented in Table 5.2.4.  
Table 5.2.4 Performance of portfolios sorted by liquidity (relative bid-ask spread) 
Period Daily Net P&L NOK Daily   NOK Sharpe NOK Max Drawdown % Daily trading cost NOK 
k Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   Top Bottom   
1997-2000                
32 -224 -207 -17 3179 2566 613 -0.071 -0.081 0.010 0.265 0.363 -0.098 164 145 19 
64 -190 -229 40 3708 2956 752 -0.051 -0.078 0.027 0.280 0.417 -0.137 99 83 16 
128 -108 -52 -56 3915 2844 1071 -0.028 -0.018 -0.009 0.212 0.253 -0.040 55 44 11 
256 35 60 -25 3487 2486 1001 0.010 0.024 -0.014 0.140 0.114 0.026 25 20 5 
 
2001-2004 
               
32 -426 -222 -204 3464 1632 1832 -0.123 -0.136 0.013 0.433 0.197 0.236 205 155 50 
64 -436 -241 -195 3857 2069 1788 -0.113 -0.117 0.004 0.549 0.310 0.239 120 118 2 
128 -391 -199 -192 4092 2267 1825 -0.096 -0.088 -0.008 0.580 0.301 0.279 38 60 -22 
256 -88 -156 68 2686 1818 868 -0.033 -0.086 0.053 0.220 0.325 -0.105 25 15 10 
 
2005-2008 
               
32 -158 -222 64 3697 2864 833 -0.042 -0.077 0.035 0.244 0.295 -0.051 127 123 4 
64 -191 -249 58 3744 3032 712 -0.051 -0.082 0.031 0.315 0.375 -0.060 67 63 4 
128 -134 -194 60 3947 3261 686 -0.034 -0.059 0.025 0.288 0.345 -0.057 34 31 3 
256 -165 -150 -15 3325 2516 809 -0.050 -0.059 0.010 0.339 0.290 0.048 12 11 1 
 
2009-2012 
               
32 -131 -198 67 3337 1771 1566 -0.039 -0.112 0.073 0.225 0.167 0.058 136 135 1 
64 -136 -158 22 3528 1923 1605 -0.038 -0.082 0.044 0.295 0.216 0.080 75 74 1 
128 -30 -12 -18 3055 1548 1507 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 0.188 0.087 0.101 34 31 3 
256 22 23 -1 1618 811 807 0.013 0.028 -0.015 0.083 0.047 0.036 10 7 3 
All portfolios are actively managed by an automatic trading algorithm. For each k-value in the 4 out of sample sub periods we simulate 
the performance for portfolios sorted by relative bid-ask spread (rBAs). This includes 32 simulations (4k-values x 4sub periods x 2sorted 
portfolios). The stocks with the lowest rBAs are included in the Top portfolio. The other half of the stocks forms the Bottom portfolio. 
The Sharpe ratio NOK is calculated as the average Daily Net Profit & Loss relative to the Daily standard deviation NOK. Maximum 
drawdown % is calculated as the largest drawdown from peak equity attained throughout the trading period. The delta column (∆) is the 
difference between results in top and bottom portfolios.     
Top are the stocks with the lowest rBAs, while bottom are those of higher rBAs. It is natural 
to think that this measure is closely linked to the market cap. Larger cap stocks are often 
more traded than smaller cap stocks, which tightens the spread and provides better 
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liquidity. Results carry some similarity to section 5.2.3. The difference in net returns does 
not behave very consistently throughout the periods. As described in section 3.3, 
transaction costs are found from the daily average of all spreads. This is also the case for 
the results in this section. Affecting differences in net profitability between the rBAs-sorted 
portfolios, the relative real-world performance of the top portfolios over the bottom 
portfolios should then increase. As in the previous case, standard deviations are higher for 
the top segment than for the bottom segment. This is due to top portfolios initiating 
significantly more trades than their counterparts. As positions tend to be closed most of the 
time30, the rise in trading activity increases daily volatility31. 
Predictability and Applicability 
The results of this section answer whether there exists persistence in the variance ratios. 
We here rely on persistence/positive serial correlation between our four year periods. All 
stocks showing a statistically low variance ratio in one sub period form the portfolio for the 
subsequent period. The summarizing results can be seen in Table 5.2.5.  
Table 5.2.5 Performance of portfolio sorted by historical VR 
All portfolios are actively managed by an automatic trading algorithm. For each k-value in the 4 out of sample sub periods we simulate 
the performance of portfolios sorted by historical VR. This includes 16 simulations (4k-values x 4sub periods x 1sorted portfolio) minus 
one simulation of zero stocks. Portfolios are formed out of stocks that had low VR in sample and also survived through the out of sample 
period. The Sharpe ratio NOK is calculated as the average Daily Net Profit & Loss relative to the Daily standard deviation NOK. Maximum 
drawdown % is calculated as the largest drawdown from peak equity attained throughout the trading period. The last column shows the 
number of stocks that held on to their significant low VR from the previous period. 
                                                     
30 Closed positions causes zero net exposure and volatility. 
31 Why trading activity increases for top stocks is an interesting observation. Still, we choose not to pursue this further.. 
Period 
k 
Daily 
Net P&L 
NOK 
Daily   
NOK 
Sharpe 
NOK 
Max 
Draw- 
down % 
Daily 
Trading 
Cost 
Number 
of 
stocks 
VR-  
persistent  
stocks 
 
1997-2000 
       
32 -160 4030 -0.040 0.220 154 3 3 
64 -3 2835 -0.001 0.134 65 1 1 
128 46 2100 0.022 0.088 21 4 3 
256 - - - - - 0 0 
 
2001-2004 
       
32 -74 1982 -0.037 0.080 152 8 5 
64 -43 2801 -0.015 0.110 125 6 2 
128 11 2209 0.005 0.083 50 7 2 
256 -104 2584 -0.040 0.290 17 10 4 
 
2005-2008 
       
32 -159 2624 -0.060 0.227 111 10 2 
64 -213 3406 -0.063 0.354 53 7 1 
128 -169 5221 -0.032 0.418 38 5 1 
256 -169 2970 -0.057 0.336 11 10 0 
 
2009-2012 
       
32 -184 3458 -0.053 0.250 136 4 2 
64 -91 4101 -0.022 0.243 79 3 2 
128 -13 2857 -0.005 0.135 19 1 1 
256 -388 7951 -0.049 0.644 18 1 0 
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As might have been expected due to earlier results, the portfolios are not able earn profits 
net of transaction costs for most periods. The last column in the table shows signs of 
persistence in the variance ratios between all periods but 2001-2008. Sharpe ratios are 
higher than for the more general portfolios in section 5.2.2 in 13 out of the 15 comparable 
cases. This suggests that it is better to rely on empirical variance ratios to persist than not. 
One should be aware of the small number of traded stocks, making results relatively 
sensitive. The main picture is that our proposed strategy does not reap additional returns 
out from the market. 
5.3 Distributions of returns and trades 
The distribution tables for portfolio returns are attached in Appendix A.6.1. Most 
daily observations lie around a zero return, often resulting from holding no active 
positions. Some outliers are present, but none extreme enough to suspect misbehaving 
either in the trading algorithm or in the dataset. 
Distribution tables for the daily net value invested are attached in Appendix A.6.2. 
Many days hold net shorting positions. This is surprising, as we would expect having daily 
net exposures around a mean of zero due to the symmetry of the Bollinger bands. Net 
exposure is negative for almost the entire first period, expecting a future fall in prices. This 
tendency is persistent for all periods but 2001–2004, where we hold a scarce majority of 
long positions. Across all periods, it is triggered more selling signals than buying signals. 
This could be due to potentially serially correlated sample distributions of the stock 
returns. For example, the fall in prices could tend to be less steep than the increases. The 
Bollinger bands will then be crossed more often in the latter case, causing more selling 
positions to be initiated. 
5.4 The mean reverting alternative: A single case study 
Finally, it is interesting to question the variance ratio criterion as an indicator of mean 
reversion. To provide an example, we look into the behaviour of a stock with a significantly 
low variance ratio32. The stock in question is WWI (Wilh. Wilhelmsen) over the 2001–
2004 period, using a  -window of 256. Its simulation history can be seen in Figure 5.4. 
                                                     
32 Being aware that this chosen example is unlikely to be representable for all others, we still believe it accentuates some 
relevant points. 
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Figure 5.4 WWI trading performance 
 
The figure shows WWI stock price (in orange) through the period 2001-2004 as an object of the contrarian trading strategy. Modified 
Bollinger bands around a 256-day moving average are shaded in gray. The red triangle indicates a short position taken when the price 
crosses the upper band. From there the price multiply with four without triggering any closing signal and the cumulative profit & loss 
plunges down.    
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.4 only one trade is being made. This is a shorting position in 
May 2002, when the price crosses the upper Bollinger band at a price just above 30 NOK. 
Surprisingly the position is never closed, as the price keeps increasing and never reverts 
back to its 256-day moving average during the rest of the period. As a result, value equal to 
three times the size of the initial position is lost33. As the variance ratio for the stock over 
the considered period is confirmed to be significantly low, this seems puzzling. By the 
expansion of the Bollinger bands, we see that volatility increases together with the price 
during the period. Just as the moving average closes in on the price in early 2004, another 
round of increase in the stock price and volatility comes in. As a result, the moving average 
does not catch up to the price within the period, and the position is never closed. This 
example shows the threat of large downsides for individual trades, as stated in section 3.3. 
As the price keeps its momentum behaviour, volatility increases. We conclude that 
increasing time-changing volatilities can greatly affect and hurt our approach. This also 
explains why trading strategies based on mean reversion are said to effectively be shorting 
volatility. 
  
                                                     
33 Notice that the result would have been even worse if we had allowed for more trades than one at a time, as commented 
in section 3.3. 
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5.5 Discussion of results 
First there was found promising evidence of irregular stock price patterns on the OSE. 
Results showed signs of a positive relationship between our test criterion, the variance 
ratio, and the success of a contrarian trading strategy. When implementing our approach in 
practice, our portfolios fell short of obtaining excessive profits. Even though we observe 
irregularities at the OSE with respect to the calculated variance ratios, this seems not to be 
consistently exploitable using our proposed strategy. A mean reverting strategy is very 
exposed to changes in volatilities, as sudden momentum in stock prices can cause severe 
losses. This can be partly avoided by imposing stop-loss rules. When looking at market cap 
and liquidity, these do not show any signs of predicting mean reversion. We observe a 
tendency of bigger and more liquid stocks initiating more trades than their counterparts. 
We want to emphasize that strict criterias and assumptions have been imposed on our data, 
and our results are relatively sensitive due to small trading samples for some portfolios. 
Still, the consistency of our results suggests validity for most of the conclusions drawn. 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper has been examining the possibilities for exploiting over reactive trading at the 
OSE. This has been done by utilising the variance ratio, which compares the short and the 
longer run volatilities of individual stocks. More common characteristics like stock market 
cap and liquidity show no clear predictability for mean reverting tendencies. Our results 
show that even if this tendency is found and believed to produce better results than other 
approaches, it may still not be profitable in practice. Empirical data may seem imperfect and 
exploitable in retrospect. By using an evaluation criterion based purely on historical price 
data, we show that nature of the real-world environment is neglected34. When examining 
empirical results, one should consider the issues of possible data mining, in-hindsight 
theory and the inability to separate market noise and fundamental changes. Chances are 
that present observed deviations are priced into the market in just a fraction of a second. If 
this is the case, the weak form efficiency hypothesis holds. We conclude that considering 
the required time invested and the few nuggets to be found, trading on mean reversion may 
not be too appealing for the common Norwegian investor. 
                                                     
34 We here refer to entirely relying on the rejection of the variance ratio test to conclude that the EMH hypothesis does 
not hold. 
          L-E. Nordby, J. Firman / Can Price Reversals in Oslo Stock Exchange be Exploited?           29 
 
A.    Appendices 
A.1 List of VR test results 
Table A.1 List of VR test statistics for all stocks per sub period 
1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2012 
k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 
ATEA -1.0 -1.2 -0.9 -0.7 AMA 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 AIK -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 AFG -2.1 -1.5 -1.3 -1.1 AFG -1.5 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 
BON 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 ATEA 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0.2 ASD 0.9 0.9 0.7 -0.2 AIK -2.3 -1.9 -1.5 -1.1 AFK -2.8 -2.5 -2.1 -1.7 
DNB 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.1 AWS -2.4 -1.9 -1.9 -1.5 ATEA -1.2 -1.1 -0.9 -0.9 AKER 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 AKER -1.6 -1.2 -1.0 -1.4 
FAR -1.7 -1.5 -1.1 -0.8 AWSB -2.2 -1.8 -1.8 -1.5 BNB -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 AKSO 0.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 AKSO -1.5 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1 
GRO 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 BEA -0.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 BON 0.0 1.2 1.5 1.2 ASD -2.3 -2.0 -1.6 -1.4 ALGETA 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 
HNA -0.9 -1.2 -1.5 -1.1 BEB -0.7 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 CRU 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.5 ATEA 0.0 0.5 0.1 -0.2 ATEA -0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.5 
HNB -0.9 -1.1 -1.4 -1.2 BLO -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 DNB -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 BLO 0.8 1.4 1.5 0.1 AUSS 2.0 2.4 1.7 1.1 
MORG 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 BNB -1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 DOF -1.1 -0.6 -0.7 -1.1 BON 1.0 1.1 0.3 -0.2 BON 0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 
NHY 0.5 -1.3 -1.4 -1.1 BON 0.1 0.4 0.5 -0.2 EKO -1.8 -1.0 -0.6 -1.1 BOR 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 BWG -0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 
ODF -1.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 BRA -1.7 -1.6 -1.5 -1.2 ELK -2.2 -1.5 -1.3 -1.1 COV 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.2 CEQ 0.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.7 
ODFB -1.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 CHS -2.3 -1.6 -1.1 -0.9 ELT 2.0 1.8 1.5 0.4 CRU 0.8 1.5 1.1 0.4 COP -0.8 -0.1 0.4 0.2 
OLT 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 CKR -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 EVRY 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 DIAG -1.0 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 DNB -1.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 
ORK 0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 COV -0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.1 EXPERT -1.7 -1.5 -1.0 -0.7 DNB -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 DOCK -1.5 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 
PGS -0.6 -1.0 -1.3 -1.2 DNB 0.5 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 FAR -0.8 -0.5 -1.1 -1.4 DOF 0.0 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 DOF 0.3 0.7 0.5 -0.5 
RIE -1.9 -1.3 -0.9 -0.8 EKO 0.2 -1.0 -1.5 -1.4 FOE 1.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 EKO -1.7 -1.5 -1.2 -1.0 EIOF -2.8 -2.2 -1.6 -1.2 
SCH -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.4 ELK -0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 FRO 0.7 1.5 1.3 0.9 EMS 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.2 EKO -2.1 -1.8 -1.3 -0.8 
SPOG -1.5 -1.8 -1.6 -1.2 FAR -2.2 -1.5 -0.9 -0.7 GRE -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 EVRY 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0.2 EMGS -1.4 -1.6 -1.6 -1.5 
TOM -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 GOD -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 GRO 0.0 1.1 1.4 1.3 FAR -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 FAR -2.1 -1.1 -0.9 -1.1 
VEI 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 GRE 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 HNA -2.2 -1.8 -1.5 -1.5 FOE -1.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.8 FOE -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4 
WWI -0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.9 GRO 0.4 0.6 0.7 -0.2 HNB -1.1 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 FRO -1.1 -0.9 -1.2 -1.3 FRO -0.6 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 
WWIB 0.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 HNA -3.4 -2.7 -2.0 -1.5 JIN -0.8 -0.1 0.4 0.3 GOD -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 GOD -2.8 -2.1 -1.8 -1.6 
. . . . . HNB -2.4 -2.0 -1.8 -1.5 KOG -2.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 GOL -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 GRO -0.4 -0.9 -0.9 -1.2 
. . . . . HYD -0.2 0.5 -0.1 -0.8 KOM -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 GRO 0.8 0.6 0.1 -0.2 GSF 3.6 4.4 3.2 1.7 
. . . . . KIT -0.4 -0.7 -2.0 -2.1 KVI 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 HELG -1.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 HELG -2.0 -1.5 -1.1 -0.6 
. . . . . KLI -2.2 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 MING 0.1 1.1 2.0 1.1 HNA 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 HNA -1.6 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 
. . . . . KOG -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 -1.5 MORG -0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.5 HNB 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 HNB -1.5 -1.5 -1.3 -1.3 
. . . . . KVI 1.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 NEC -0.8 -1.3 -1.4 -1.1 IGE -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.5 IMSK -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 
. . . . . LHO -2.4 -2.0 -1.6 -1.5 NER -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.6 IMSK -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 KOG -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7 
. . . . . MORG -1.3 -1.2 -1.0 -0.9 NHY 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 JSHIP 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.7 LSG 0.7 1.9 1.4 0.9 
. . . . . NBK -0.3 -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 NONG -0.9 -0.4 0.4 0.1 KOG -1.3 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 MING -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
. . . . . NER 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.4 NSG -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 KOM 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 MORG -3.2 -2.5 -1.7 -1.3 
. . . . . NHY -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 OCR 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 LSG 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.4 NAS 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 
. . . . . NONG -0.5 -1.2 -1.3 -1.1 ODF -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 MING -0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.1 NHY -1.2 -1.0 -0.7 -1.1 
. . . . . NOV 0.0 0.7 0.2 -0.7 ODFB 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 MORG -1.3 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 NOD -0.3 0.5 1.1 1.1 
. . . . . NSG 0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.8 OLT -2.7 -2.0 -1.4 -1.4 NAS 2.1 2.9 3.9 2.2 NONG -1.5 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 
. . . . . NSGB 0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.9 OPC -1.0 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0 NEC -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2 NPEL -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 
. . . . . OCR 1.7 1.3 0.3 -0.4 ORK -0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.4 NHY -0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.4 ODF -1.1 -0.3 -0.4 -1.3 
. . . . . ODF -0.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 ORO -0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 NONG -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 ODFB -0.2 0.5 0.2 -1.1 
. . . . . ODFB -0.8 0.4 0.4 0.0 PGS 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 NSG -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 OLT -2.4 -1.7 -1.2 -1.1 
. . . . . OLT -1.0 -0.9 -0.6 -1.0 PHO 0.9 0.8 -0.1 -0.5 ODF -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 OPERA -1.7 -1.5 -1.4 -1.5 
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Table A.1 continued: List of VR test statistics for all stocks per sub period 
1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2012 
k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 k 32 64 128 256 
. . . . . ORK 0.7 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 PLUG -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.3 ODFB -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 ORK -1.8 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 
. . . . . PDR -0.8 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 PRS -1.3 -0.9 -0.7 -1.0 OLT -1.4 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 PGS -1.4 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 
. . . . . PGS -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 RCL 2.1 1.0 0.1 -0.4 OPERA 0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 PHO -1.3 -1.2 -1.0 -1.2 
. . . . . RANG -2.1 -2.1 -1.8 -1.5 RIE -2.8 -2.3 -1.9 -1.5 ORK -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 PRON -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 
. . . . . RIE -1.5 -1.1 -1.4 -1.4 ROGG 0.9 2.3 3.2 1.6 PDR 1.6 1.1 0.9 0.5 PRS -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 -1.5 
. . . . . RIEB -1.0 -0.9 -1.2 -1.3 SADG -1.6 -1.1 -0.9 -1.0 PGS 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.2 QFR -2.1 -1.7 -1.3 -1.4 
. . . . . RING -1.9 -1.7 -1.5 -1.2 SANG -2.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.7 PHO -2.2 -1.1 -0.6 -0.7 RCL 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 
. . . . . RNA -1.0 -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 SCH -1.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 PRS -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 RIE -2.6 -2.4 -2.6 -2.3 
. . . . . ROGG 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 SINO -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 RCL -0.6 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8 SADG -0.7 -0.9 -0.7 -0.5 
. . . . . SADG -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6 SME -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 REACH -0.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 SALM -2.4 -1.4 -0.8 -0.6 
. . . . . SANG -3.0 -2.4 -1.8 -1.3 SMEB -0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.1 RIE -2.5 -1.8 -1.7 -1.1 SBVG -1.5 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 
. . . . . SASB -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.5 SNI 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 ROGG -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 SCH 0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 
. . . . . SBVG -1.4 -1.9 -1.7 -1.3 SOFF -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.9 SADG 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.3 SDRL -1.3 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1 
. . . . . SCH 0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.5 SOI 1.2 1.7 2.1 1.4 SBVG -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 SEVAN 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.5 
. . . . . SFJ 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 SPOG -2.2 -1.5 -0.9 -0.9 SCH -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 SNI 0.1 -0.7 -1.1 -1.1 
. . . . . SME -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4 STB 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.2 SEVAN 1.0 1.2 0.5 -0.2 SOAG -1.3 -1.3 -0.8 -0.3 
. . . . . SMEB 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 SUBC 1.0 1.2 1.4 0.9 SFM -0.8 -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 SOFF -2.5 -1.7 -1.4 -1.3 
. . . . . SNIB 1.1 0.8 0.5 -0.1 SUO -1.5 -1.2 -1.0 -0.6 SNI -1.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 SPOG 2.1 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 
. . . . . SNOG 0.5 0.1 0.2 -0.1 SVEG -0.8 -0.5 -0.2 -0.9 SOFF -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 STB -1.4 -1.1 -0.7 -0.7 
. . . . . SPOG -2.6 -2.2 -1.7 -1.2 TAA -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 SPOG -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 STL -2.3 -1.9 -1.6 -1.5 
. . . . . SST -1.2 -0.6 -0.8 -1.4 TAD 1.8 2.9 3.9 2.6 SSI -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 -0.7 SUBC -1.6 -1.2 -1.2 -1.0 
. . . . . STB -1.4 -1.1 -1.3 -1.2 TAT 1.5 1.9 2.9 3.1 STB 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 SVEG -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 -1.2 
. . . . . SVEG 1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.3 TEL -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 STL -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -1.0 TEL -1.2 -1.3 -1.0 -0.9 
. . . . . TAA 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.4 TGS 0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.2 STXEUR 0.1 -0.3 -1.1 -0.8 TELIO -2.7 -1.7 -1.0 -0.7 
. . . . . TAD 1.2 1.8 1.7 -0.3 TOM -1.3 -1.6 -1.5 -1.4 SUB 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 TGS -1.6 -1.2 -1.0 -1.2 
. . . . . TAT -0.4 -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 TOTG -1.5 -0.8 -0.6 -1.3 SUBC -0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.3 TOM -2.4 -2.0 -1.7 -1.5 
. . . . . TOM -1.4 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 VEI -1.3 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 SVEG -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 TOTG -1.7 -1.4 -1.0 -0.6 
. . . . . TOTG -2.1 -1.5 -1.1 -1.0 VIS 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 TAA -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 VEI -0.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.7 
. . . . . UNS -2.5 -1.8 -1.4 -1.1 VME -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.1 TCO -3.1 -2.4 -1.8 -1.3 VIZ -0.5 -0.3 -0.9 -1.4 
. . . . . UTO -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 WWI -1.8 -1.3 -1.1 -1.3 TEL 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 WWI -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -1.3 
. . . . . VIS -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 -1.0 WWIB -2.0 -1.6 -1.3 -1.3 TGS -1.1 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 WWIB -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -1.2 
. . . . . WWI -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 . . . . . TOM -1.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 YAR -1.0 -1.0 -1.3 -1.2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TOTG -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.6 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VEI -0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.1 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIZ -1.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WWI 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WWIB -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YAR 0.6 1.2 0.6 -0.6 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
21 3a 1b 4c 0d 72 17a 16b 17c 19d 71 15a 10 b 6c 11d 78 7a 7b 5c 5d 72 27a 19b 12c 21d 
The table lists all VR test statistics on  -period values: 32, 64, 128 and 256 for the selected stocks in each of the 5 sub periods from 1993-
1996 to 2009-2012. The bottom line shows total number of available stocks and numbers of stocks with significant test-statistic. The 
critical test-statistic values are collected from Lo & MacKinlay (1988) in their results on the Variance ratio test’s empirical quantiles (p. 
36).  The superscripts a, b, c and d indicate the actual k-period value (32, 64,128, and 256) and their respective critical values -1.5, -1.46, 
 -1.38 and -1.23. In sub period 1993-1996 for k-period value: 32, we see that the three stocks FAR, RIE and SPOG have a lower test-
statistic (in bold) than the critical value -1.5 and give us the number 3 at the bottom line. 
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A.2 List of stocks 
Table A.2 List of stock tickers and company names for our144 selected stocks 
AFG AF Gruppen NSG Norske Skogindustrier 
AFK Arendals Fossekompani NSGB Norske Skog B 
AIK Aktiv Kapital OCR Ocean Rig 
AKER Aker ODF Odfjell ser. A 
AKSO Aker Solutions ODFB Odfjell ser. B 
ALGETA Algeta OLT Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap 
AMA Aker Maritime OPC Opticom 
ASD Axis-Shield OPERA Opera Software 
ATEA Atea ORK Orkla 
AUSS Austevoll Seafood ORO ORIGIO 
AWS Awilco ser. A PDR Petrolia E&P Holdings 
AWSB Awilco ser. B PGS Petroleum Geo-Services 
BEA Bergesen d.y ser. A PHO Photocure 
BEB Bergesen d.y ser. B PLUG Sparebanken Pluss 
BLO Blom PRON Pronova BioPharma 
BNB Bolig- og Næringsbanken PRS Prosafe 
BON Bonheur QFR Q-Free 
BOR Borgestad RANG Sparebanken Rana 
BRA Braathens RCL Royal Caribbean Cruises 
BWG BWG Homes REACH Reach Subsea 
CEQ Cermaq RIE Rieber & Søn 
CHS Choice Hotels Scandinavia RIEB Rieber & Søn B 
CKR Chr. Bank og Kreditkasse RING SpareBank 1 Ringerike Hadeland 
COP Copeinca RNA Reitan Narvesen 
COV ContextVision ROGG SpareBank 1 SR-Bank 
CRU Crew Gold Corporation SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
DIAG DiaGenic SALM SalMar 
DNB DNB SANG Sandsvær Sparebank 
DOCK Dockwise SASB SAS Norge B 
DOF DOF SBVG SpareBank 1 Buskerud-Vestfold 
EIOF Eidesvik Offshore SCH Schibsted 
EKO Ekornes SDRL Seadrill 
ELK Elkem SEVAN Sevan Marine 
ELT Eltek SFJ DSND Subsea 
EMGS Electromagnetic Geoservices SFM Synnøve Finden 
EMS EMS Seven Seas SINO SinOceanic Shipping 
EVRY EVRY SME Smedvig ser. A 
EXPERT Expert SMEB Smedvig  ser. B 
FAR Farstad Shipping SNI Stolt-Nielsen 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy SNIB Stolt-Nielsen B 
FRO Frontline SNOG Gjensidige NOR Sparebank 
GOD Goodtech SOAG SpareBank 1 Østfold Akershus 
GOL Golar LNG SOFF Solstad Offshore 
GRE Gresvig SOI Software Innovation 
GRO Ganger Rolf SPOG Sparebanken Øst 
GSF Grieg Seafood SSI Siem Shipping 
HELG Helgeland Sparebank SST Steen & Strøm 
HNA Hafslund ser. A STB Storebrand 
HNB Hafslund ser. B STL Statoil 
HYD Hydralift STXEUR STX Europe 
IGE IGE Resources  SUB Subsea 7 
IMSK I.M. Skaugen SUBC Subsea 7 
JIN Jinhui Shipping and Transportation SUO SuperOffice 
JSHIP Jason Shipping SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
KIT Kitron TAA Tandberg 
KLI Klippen Invest TAD Tandberg Data 
KOG Kongsberg Gruppen TAT Tandberg Television 
KOM Komplett TCO TeleComputing 
KVI Kværner TEL Telenor 
LHO Leif Höegh & Co TELIO Telio Holding 
LSG Lerøy Seafood Group TGS TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company 
MING SpareBank 1 SMN TOM Tomra Systems 
MORG Sparebanken Møre TOTG Totens Sparebank 
NAS Norwegian Air Shuttle UNS Ugland Nordic Shipping 
NBK Nordlandsbanken UTO Unitor 
NEC Norse Energy Corp. VEI Veidekke 
NER Nera VIS Visma 
NHY Norsk Hydro VIZ Vizrt 
NOD Nordic Semiconductor VME VMetro 
NONG SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ser. A 
NOV Norsk Vekst WWIB Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ser. B 
NPEL Norway Pelagic YAR Yara International 
32            L-E. Nordby, J. Firman / Can Price Reversals in Oslo Stock Exchange be Exploited?       
 
A.3 Overview of abbreviations and formula notation 
 Table A.3.1 Commonly used abbrevations 
VR variance ratio 
MR mean reversion 
OSE Oslo Stock Exchange 
EMH efficient market hypothesis 
RW random walk 
rBAs relative bid-ask spread 
  
Table A.3.2 Notation used in section 3.2  
  time (days) 
  daily time window for the mean reverting process  
  number of observations in sub period 
   stock price  
   standard Brownian motion/wiener process 
μ percentagewise drift rate 
σ standard deviation 
dt time interval 
  stochastic random variable          
   logarithmic stock returns 
  
Table A.3.3 Notation used in section 3.3 
  notation for stock i 
  transaction cost 
   moving average 
   upper Bollinger band 
   lower Bollinger band 
   middle Bollinger band 
  
Table A.3.4 Widely used formulas 
Average  ̅  
 
 
 ∑  
 
   
  
Moving average   (    )  
                
 
  
Variance           
 
 
 ∑     ̅ 
 
 
   
  
Standard deviation         √        
Covariance          
 
 
 ∑     ̅      ̅ 
 
   
  
Correlation      
        
    
  
Beta coefficient      
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A.4 Derivation of applied formulas 
Derivation A.4.1 Solution for the geometric Brownian motion – from section 3.2 
 
The geometric Brownian motion is specified as 
   
  
                      
To solve for   , we apply    ̅ calculus and get 
          
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
  
                  
 
 
 
 
  
    
    
    
   
                       
 
 
     
Integrating and applying the fundamental theorem of calculus we get 
              (   
 
 
  
 )          
       
(   
 
 
  
 )             
 ̂            
which by taking logarithms gives 
                ̂ ̂          
and  
                     
     
By applying the formula for the expected value of a Gaussian random variable 
            
 
 
  
 
  
If quickly follows that  
          
    
We have set   equal to 10.7% on a yearly basis, a number used in Johnsen (1996) as a historical average 
yearly return for the OSE. 
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By using the definition of returns being equal to the difference in logged prices, we have that 
      
                     
         
 
 
   (                                                             )
         
 
                    
         
 
    ∑
     
 
   
   
   
 
Derivation A.4.2 The standardised variance ratio statistic – from section 3.2 
The heteroscedasticity-robust standardised test-statistic can then be formulated as:  
      
     
√  √          
 
where  
   (     )  ∑ [
       
 
]
 
  ̂   
   
   
 
and 
 ̂    
∑             ̅̅̅̅  
                 ̅̅̅̅
 
      
  
 ∑            ̅̅̅̅    
 
   
    
̅̅̅̅  
 
 
         
For the underlying assumptions on the form of heteroscedasticity, see Lo & MacKinlay (1986) p. 25 
 
A.5  Formulation of the trading signal indicators in the quantitative model 
Our model allows no room for emotions and subjective decision making, and can be mathematically 
formulated as follows. See description of notation above in Table A.3.3. 
 
                      {
          
           
  
                       {
          
           
 
                              {
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A.6 Sample distributions from the stock universe portfolio 
Figure A.6.1 Distributions of Daily Net Profit & Loss 
The distributions originate from the results in section 5.2. We retrieve the distribution of average Daily Net Profit & Loss from all the 
simulations. For each of the 20 simulations (4-values x 5sub periods) we chart the distribution and compile them in this overview. 
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Figure A.6.2 Distributions of Daily Net portfolio value 
 
The distributions originate from the results in section 5.2. We retrieve the distribution of average Daily Net portfolio value from all the 
simulations. For each of the 20 simulations (4k-values x 5sub periods) we chart the distributions and compile them in this overview. 
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A.7 Price development on Oslo Stock Exchange 
Figure A.7 Oslo All Share Index 1993-2012 
 
The chart shows the development of the broad Oslo All Share index from 1993-2012  
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